Social networking dangers

Social networking has transformed the way people communicate, share information, and maintain relationships. What once required a telephone call, letter, or face-to-face meeting can now be achieved in seconds. Families stay connected across continents, businesses engage with customers directly, and professionals can build networks that would have been difficult to establish only a few decades ago.

Despite these benefits, social networking also introduces risks that are often underestimated. Many users focus on the convenience and social aspects of these platforms without fully considering how the information they share could be used by others.

The challenge is that many social networking risks do not arise from sophisticated cyber-attacks. Instead, they frequently result from people voluntarily providing information that can later be exploited.

A digital footprint that never sleeps

Every post, photograph, comment, reaction, and connection contributes to a person’s digital footprint. While a single post may appear harmless in isolation, the combination of hundreds or thousands of posts over many years can reveal a surprisingly detailed picture of someone’s life. Employment history, family relationships, travel plans, hobbies, political opinions, purchasing habits, and daily routines can often be inferred.

Many people assume they have nothing worth hiding. However, privacy is not simply about hiding wrongdoing. It is about maintaining control over personal information and deciding how that information is used.

The social engineering problem

Social engineering is often misunderstood as a highly technical subject. In reality, it is frequently little more than exploiting trust and available information.

An attacker who knows where someone works, the names of their family members, their recent holiday destination, and their hobbies already has a significant advantage. Much of this information can often be gathered from social networking sites.

A message from a stranger may be ignored. A message that references a colleague, a recent event, or a shared interest is far more likely to receive a response.

This is one of the reasons social networking information is frequently used to support phishing campaigns, fraud attempts, and identity verification bypasses.

Oversharing in real time

One behaviour that continues to concern me is the tendency for people to share information in real time. Photographs posted from airports, holiday destinations, concerts, and sporting events may seem harmless. However, they can also suggest that a property is currently unoccupied.

Similarly, posts discussing upcoming business travel, attendance at conferences, or major organisational changes may provide useful intelligence to criminals, competitors, or hostile actors. The issue is rarely the individual post itself, but the cumulative picture that emerges over time.

Professional risks

The dangers are not limited to personal security. Employees frequently identify their employers on social networking platforms and may unintentionally disclose information about projects, customers, technologies, or internal activities.

Even seemingly harmless comments can create difficulties. A photograph of a workstation may reveal information displayed on screens. A casual discussion about work may expose operational details. A complaint about a customer or supplier may damage professional relationships.

Many organisations invest heavily in technical security controls while overlooking the risks created through public disclosure.

The AI dimension

Artificial intelligence introduces another consideration. Information that once required significant effort to collect can now be processed at scale. Large volumes of publicly available content can be aggregated, categorised, and analysed automatically.

As AI capabilities continue to improve, the value of publicly available personal information is likely to increase rather than decrease. Information that appears insignificant today may become useful when combined with thousands of other data points tomorrow.

This creates a significant challenge for both privacy and governance professionals. The risks associated with data are no longer limited to the information we intentionally collect. They also extend to information people voluntarily publish themselves.

Practical measures

Many social networking risks can be reduced through simple habits:

  • Review privacy settings regularly.
  • Limit the amount of personal information shared publicly.
  • Be cautious when accepting connection requests from unknown individuals.
  • Avoid sharing travel plans before or during a trip.
  • Consider how a post might be interpreted by employers, customers, and strangers.
  • Periodically review older content that remains publicly accessible.
  • Remember that deleting a post does not guarantee it has disappeared.

These measures are neither complex nor expensive, but they can significantly reduce risks.

Conclusions

Social networking platforms are neither inherently good nor inherently bad. Like many technologies, they provide opportunities as well as risks.

The real danger often comes from familiarity. Because social networking has become such a normal part of everyday life, it is easy to forget how much information is being shared and who may be able to access it.

Many years ago, obtaining detailed information about an individual required time, effort, and resources. Today, much of that information may be available through a few searches and a little patience.

The question is not whether people should use social networking platforms. The question is whether they are sharing more than they realise.

The limits of implementing spending restrictions

Restrictions on how money can be spent are not new. Gift vouchers, grants, insurance settlements, and welfare payments can all carry conditions governing where or how their value may be used.

Modern payment technologies make it possible to apply increasingly sophisticated restrictions, but an important question remains: does controlling how money is spent control the outcome?

This article explores that question through practical examples, considering the difference between enforcing restrictions on individual transactions and influencing how people ultimately use their financial resources.

A question that began with student grants

Between 1993 and 1997, while at university, a group of us were invited to participate in a round table about student grants and whether public funding should come with conditions governing how it could be spent. This was part of a PhD programme on applying restrictions on the use of public funds.

The conversation began with student grants, but its scope soon widened. We moved from funding for students to welfare payments, and then to the broader question of whether the state should exercise control over money provided for a particular social purpose.

The question was straightforward. If public money was provided to support someone’s education or meet a household’s essential needs, could restrictions ensure that it was used for its intended purpose? For example, could conditions ensure that funding was spent on books, food, housing, or childcare, rather than alcohol, tobacco, gambling, or unrelated expenditure?

At the time, the practical options included vouchers, restricted cards, cheques made payable to particular organisations, or the direct provision of goods and services.

Modern digital payment systems make it possible to apply more detailed restrictions automatically. Depending on the technology and information available, payments can be approved or declined according to the retailer, product category, amount, location, or time of day. More sophisticated arrangements can also restrict purchases of individual products where retailers provide the necessary information.

Technology has changed the ease and precision with which spending restrictions can be applied. It has not resolved the economic and practical problem that our university round table identified more than 30 years ago.

A system can control the original transaction, but it cannot necessarily control how the recipient ultimately uses their resources.

Lessons from gift vouchers

My first experience of restrictions on how money could be spent was much more ordinary. As a child and teenager, I often received WH Smith vouchers. They had value, but they could be spent only at WH Smith.

Today, gift vouchers and prepaid cards are available for a wide range of retailers and services. When I was growing up, the options were more limited. If I needed something from another shop, the WH Smith voucher could not be used directly to buy it.

That did not mean the voucher had no value outside WH Smith. I recall asking members of my family whether they needed anything from the shop. If they did, I could use my voucher to buy what they wanted. The money they would otherwise have spent could then be given to me, or used to buy something I needed from somewhere else.

The voucher remained restricted at the checkout, but its economic value had effectively been converted into something more flexible through an informal exchange.

Nothing improper had occurred. The retailer accepted the voucher according to its terms and conditions, the family member received the product they wanted, and I obtained value that I could use elsewhere. The example simply demonstrated that controlling where a voucher is redeemed does not necessarily control who receives its ultimate benefit. The same principle applies to grants and welfare payments.

Restricted payments are nothing new

I encountered another form of restricted payment after my bicycle was stolen and I made an insurance claim. Rather than sending me a cheque that I could pay into my own account, the insurance company issued a cheque made payable to a specific bicycle shop near where I lived.

The insurer had accepted the claim and provided the agreed value, but it had also controlled the immediate destination of the payment. Only the named bicycle shop could pay in the cheque, which meant that I could not simply deposit the insurance proceeds and spend them elsewhere.

The insurance company had attached a condition to the settlement by specifying who could receive the payment. The banking system enforced that restriction because the cheque could not normally be paid into an account held under a different name. This was a simple way of controlling where the money was initially spent, long before modern digital payment systems made more sophisticated restrictions possible.

The arrangement worked reasonably well because the transaction had a narrow purpose, involved a one-off payment, and identified a suitable supplier. Even so, it controlled only the first use of the money. Once I had obtained a replacement bicycle, I could use it, give it away, exchange it, or sell it.

As with the WH Smith vouchers, the restriction governed the original transaction without permanently controlling the value created by it. Modern payment technology can apply these conditions more quickly and precisely, but the underlying concept is not new.

What spending restrictions can achieve

Modern payment systems can enforce spending restrictions automatically. For example, a restricted food benefit could be used to purchase milk, vegetables, meat, bread, and infant formula, while preventing direct purchases of alcohol, tobacco, or other excluded products and services.

A student grant could be limited to tuition fees, books, approved equipment, accommodation, or public transport. Housing assistance could be paid directly to a landlord, childcare support could be limited to registered providers, and an energy grant could be accepted only by authorised utility companies.

These controls are technically workable. Existing prepaid cards, voucher schemes, expense cards, and electronic benefit systems already apply restrictions based on retailers or product categories. Rules might be applied across different banks, wallets, retailers, and connected devices. Conditions could be checked instantly, and transaction records could confirm whether the payment had complied with the programme’s rules.

If the objective is to demonstrate that a particular grant or benefit was not used directly to purchase a prohibited item, programmability can achieve it.

The difficulty begins when that narrow result is treated as evidence that the recipient’s wider behaviour has been controlled.

The problem of interchangeability

One £10 note has the same face value and purchasing power as another £10 note. A shop does not need to care which particular note it receives. A restricted voucher is less interchangeable because it cannot be used everywhere or for every product. Nevertheless, receiving the voucher can change how the recipient uses other money.

Suppose a household normally spends £100 each week on food. It then receives a £30 food benefit that cannot be used for alcohol or tobacco. The household can use the benefit for £30 of its normal groceries and use only £70 of its own money for the remainder. The restricted benefit has released £30 of unrestricted money. That £30 can now be spent on anything.

The payment system can show that the benefit purchased food. It cannot show that the household spent £30 more on food than it would otherwise have done, or £30 less on alcohol or tobacco.

This illustrates the economic principle of fungibility. Money allocated to one purpose can free up other money for a different purpose. The restricted payment substitutes for expenditure that would have happened anyway, allowing the household to redirect its existing resources.

Helping someone in the community

I encountered the same issue when someone I knew in the local community, who was experiencing financial difficulties, asked me for £30 to help buy food. I considered giving him a gift card that could be used only for groceries, ensuring that my contribution was spent on the purpose for which he had requested it.

Such a card would have ensured that my contribution was spent directly on groceries. If he had no food and no other money, it would have provided an immediate source of support that could not easily be diverted to other purchases.

However, if he already had £30 that he intended to spend on groceries, my card could simply replace that expenditure. His existing £30 would then be available for alcohol or anything else.

I realised that I could control the direct use of the card, but not its effect on the rest of his budget. The card might increase the resources available to him, but it would not necessarily change how he allocated his money.

In the end, I simply gave him £30 in cash. I had decided to help him, and restricting how he spent the money would not necessarily achieve anything useful.

Barter bypasses restrictions

Restrictions can also be bypassed through barter. Someone could use their salary to buy alcohol, while a friend receiving restricted benefits could use those benefits to buy food. They could then exchange the goods. Both original purchases would comply with the payment rules, but the intended restriction would have been circumvented.

A secondary market could develop around the same principle. Someone might exchange £30 of permitted groceries for £20 or £25 in cash, alcohol, or another prohibited item. The difference in value would compensate the other participant for the inconvenience and risk.

Recipients might also buy groceries for relatives in return for cash, purchase items that can easily be resold, or allow another person to use their card.

A restricted payment system can control which purchases are authorised, but it cannot necessarily control what happens to the goods afterwards. Once purchased, those goods may be exchanged, given away, or resold without involving the original payment system.

This does not mean restrictions have no effect. They introduce inconvenience, transaction costs, and the need to find another participant. These obstacles may discourage some prohibited expenditure, but they do not eliminate it.

Technology can prevent a restricted card from purchasing alcohol directly, but it cannot abolish barter, substitution, resale, or cooperation between individuals.

The limits of closing every loophole

A system designed to close these loopholes would have to move beyond payment controls. It might require identity checks at the point of sale, limits on the quantity of particular goods, analysis of unusual purchasing patterns, controls on who can use the card, and investigations into suspected resale.

Even those measures would not determine what happened to every product after purchase. Food can be shared, exchanged, given away, or sold. Families regularly shop for one another, combine their resources, and move goods between households.

As spending restrictions become more detailed, the systems needed to enforce them become more complicated. Retailers must classify eligible products accurately, payment systems must apply the current rules, and administrators must resolve exceptions when legitimate purchases are declined.

Mixed shopping baskets create another practical difficulty. A customer may attempt to buy food, toiletries, clothing, and a bottle of wine in one transaction. The system must identify the permitted items, apply the restricted balance to those items, and request another payment method for the remainder.

Product classification creates another practical difficulty. A system must determine how to treat prepared meals, nutritional supplements, medicines, pet food, cleaning products, and other items that may be essential in some households but excluded by a simple definition of food.

Technical restrictions therefore require accurate product information, clear rules, retailer participation, reliable payment infrastructure, and a process for correcting mistakes.

The administrative burden would extend well beyond building the original system. Rules would have to be maintained, retailers would require support, disputes would have to be investigated, appeals would have to be decided, and incorrectly declined payments would have to be resolved. All of this would carry a continuing cost.

Where restricted payments work best

Spending restrictions are most practical when a payment has a clearly defined purpose, a limited range of permitted uses, and an identifiable supplier or service provider.

A home-insulation grant can be limited to approved work carried out by registered installers. Childcare support can be paid to recognised providers. A training grant can cover specified courses, equipment, and examination fees. An energy payment can be credited directly to a utility account. These arrangements work because the number of permitted uses is limited, and the intended supplier can be identified.

The position becomes more difficult when restrictions are applied to someone’s main subsistence income. Ordinary life includes rent, food, transport, clothing, toiletries, communications, household repairs, debts, school costs, and emergencies. A centrally maintained list cannot anticipate every reasonable purchase or every household circumstance.

A practical system must therefore distinguish between a payment made to settle a specific, verified liability and a general payment intended to support the recipient’s ordinary living costs.

Direct payment of housing costs

Housing costs provide an example of where a payment can be directed towards a specific obligation without attempting to control the recipient’s wider spending. Housing benefit, or an equivalent housing-cost payment, can be paid directly to a landlord where the applicable rules permit it. This allows a clearly identified liability to be settled without requiring restrictions on the recipient’s other financial transactions.

Housing support relates to an identifiable liability, an agreed amount, and a known recipient. Paying it directly to the landlord contributes towards settling the rent for which that part of the benefit was calculated. It does not require the government to classify thousands of products, monitor everyday shopping, or decide how the recipient may spend the remainder of their income.

This is different from placing restrictions on a general subsistence payment. Once the rent has been paid, the recipient remains responsible for managing their remaining entitlement and other income.

Direct payment can therefore be reasonable where a benefit is calculated specifically to meet a verified obligation. It is a targeted payment to a known creditor, rather than an attempt to control the recipient’s wider financial behaviour.

What a workable system would require

A system intended to restrict how money is spent needs a clear and measurable objective. Its designers must decide whether the purpose is to prevent particular purchases, increase spending on essential goods and services, reduce expenditure on prohibited products, or achieve a wider outcome, such as improved nutrition or child welfare. These objectives are not interchangeable.

A system may successfully block thousands of attempted purchases without increasing the amount of food reaching children. Conversely, a programme may improve food security even though it cannot prevent every instance of substitution or barter.

Operationally, a workable system would require:

  • Clear definitions of permitted and prohibited expenditure.
  • Accurate classification of retailers, services, and individual products.
  • Support for mixed shopping baskets and multiple payment methods.
  • Wide acceptance among large retailers, small shops, online services, and rural providers.
  • Arrangements for lost cards, technical failures, and offline transactions.
  • Rapid correction when a legitimate purchase is declined.
  • Controls against fraud that do not prevent normal family shopping.
  • Regular evaluation based on real outcomes, rather than declined transactions alone.
  • A clear distinction between restricted grants and general-purpose money.

Most importantly, claims made for the system must reflect what the technology can actually prove.

Practical conclusions

Modern payment systems can impose increasingly sophisticated restrictions on how money is spent. However, the ability to enforce those restrictions does not necessarily mean that they will achieve their intended outcomes, or that the costs and complexity of implementing them can be justified.

There is an important distinction between determining eligibility for financial support, calculating the correct entitlement, preventing fraudulent claims, and controlling how money is spent after it has been received. The first three concern the administration of a payment. The fourth introduces a different set of technical, economic, and practical challenges, particularly when the payment is intended to meet general living expenses.

Basic spending restrictions are not particularly difficult to implement. Gift cards, prepaid cards, and other restricted payment methods already demonstrate that purchases can be limited to particular retailers or categories of goods. The complexity increases when an organisation attempts to control spending in greater detail or prevent recipients from circumventing restrictions. This would require increasingly sophisticated product classifications, integration with retailers, monitoring of transactions, investigation of suspected workarounds, and procedures for handling exceptions and incorrectly declined purchases. Retailers, payment providers, administrators, and recipients would all bear part of that burden.

The more comprehensive the restrictions, the greater the potential administrative burden. A system designed to prevent particular purchases may be relatively straightforward, but one intended to prevent substitution, resale, barter, or other workarounds would be considerably more difficult to operate and enforce. Such a system could involve continuing costs for administration, retailer support, complaints, appeals, security, and changes to the rules. Legitimate purchases might still be declined, while some recipients could continue to find ways around the restrictions.

Whether spending restrictions are worthwhile depends on what they are intended to achieve and the costs of implementing them. A system might demonstrate that a particular payment was not used directly to purchase alcohol or tobacco, but it could not establish that the recipient had not obtained those products through other means. The distinction matters when evaluating effectiveness. Preventing a particular transaction is a measurable result, but it should not be confused with demonstrating a wider change in spending behaviour.

The experiences described in this article illustrate the distinction. My WH Smith vouchers were restricted to one retailer, but I could exchange their practical value by purchasing something for a family member. My bicycle-insurance cheque was payable to a particular shop, but the insurer could not control what happened to the replacement bicycle afterwards. A restricted food payment could ensure that groceries were purchased, while freeing other money for a different purpose.

These limitations are not simply technical problems that more sophisticated payment systems can solve. They arise because people can rearrange their resources, exchange goods, and cooperate with one another.

As spending restrictions become more elaborate, the systems needed to administer, maintain, and enforce them are likely to become more costly. Each additional rule creates the potential for exceptions, unintended consequences, and new ways of working around the restrictions. People can adapt their behaviour, exchange goods, or rearrange their finances in response to the controls imposed. Increasing the sophistication of a payment system may make particular transactions easier to restrict, but it does not necessarily make the ultimate outcome easier to control.

The central insight from our university round table therefore remains valid more than 30 years later. Technology can govern the payment, but it cannot guarantee the outcome.

 

Cyber risks I expect to matter more in 2026

In previous years I have focused on what other people think will be the top cyber risks for next year. This year I decided to come up with my own list based on professional work in this space, attending seminars, and watching webinars. Much of the future speculation appears to have a marketing angle, but that doesn’t change the actual risk or make anyone wrong to talk about the issues; it just gives professionals a greater interest in specific subject matter. Based on similar experiences, my focus here is deliberately narrow, concentrating on two areas I expect to matter more in 2026.

Shadow AI will become a much higher and growing risk

The rapid adoption of AI tools inside businesses will continue to expand a new class of unmanaged risk. Employees are using public and semi-public AI systems to draft documents, analyse data, and make decisions without visibility, guidance, or approval. In many cases, sensitive information, internal context, or intellectual property is being shared with external systems by default. Although the use of Shadow AI is rarely malicious, I expect it to become more widespread while remaining largely invisible to security teams. I also expect the cumulative risk from unsanctioned AI use to exceed that of many Shadow IT problems because of the scale, speed, and lack of transparency.

  • AI tools are already embedded in everyday work – use of AI to draft, summarise, analyse, or make decisions is normal behaviour, not experimentation. This continues to push usage outside of formal approval processes.
  • Security teams cannot keep pace with adoption – AI tools appear faster than policies, reviews, or risk assessments can be written or enforced.
  • Consumer AI tools outperform approved enterprise tools – staff will default to what works best and fastest, regardless of policy or guidance. 
  • Data sharing is implicit, not explicit – AI tools retain prompts, context, or outputs by default and users rarely understand where the data is stored and how it could be used.
  • AI usage is more difficult to detect – Shadow AI does not behave like traditional Shadow IT and it can leave minimal network or endpoint footprint. 
  • Business pressure rewards speed over control – productivity gains from AI will be expected and staff will often bypass any controls that slow down its usage.

Data exfiltration will become more prevalent than ransomware

I expect to see a shift from system-locking ransomware to pure data exfiltration. Encrypting entire environments is inefficient, noisy, and increasingly well-defended against. It is far simpler for attackers to breach a network, quietly extract valuable data, and apply pressure through the threat of public release. This approach will bypass many ransomware controls and directly target reputational damage, regulatory exposure, loss of customer trust, and financial impact. 

  • Network-wide encryption is noisy and slow – it triggers alerts, response plans, backups, and law enforcement involvement. 
  • Backup and recovery capabilities have improved – ransomware encryption alone doesn’t guarantee payment.
  • Exfiltration is harder to detect than encryption – data theft can be gradual, selective, and disguised as normal traffic.
  • Stolen data creates multiple monetisation options – attackers can extort, sell, reuse, or leak data in stages.
  • Reputational damage is harder to recover from than downtime – public exposure of sensitive data causes lasting harm beyond technical recovery.
  • Regulatory penalties amplify attacker leverage – breach notification laws and fines make data exposure more costly than service disruption.
  • Attackers can pressure businesses without destroying systems – this reduces operational risk for criminals, lowers barriers to entry, and opens up a subscription model for cybercrime.
  • Cloud and Software as a Service (SaaS) architectures centralise valuable data – stealing data is easier than encrypting distributed environments.

Concluding thoughts

These two reflect the same underlying shift:

  • Data is the primary asset
  • Speed and invisibility beat disruption
  • Human behaviour matters more than technical exploits

Many other cyber risks will continue to evolve through 2026 and none of these should be ignored. These two risks represent a significant shift where risk accumulates the fastest and with the least visibility. Focusing on these areas should not involve ignoring or sidelining other risks, but recognising AI governance, privacy, and human behaviour could matter the most.

 

Further Reading

 

Protect your home with land registry property alerts

Imagine discovering that someone has taken out a mortgage on your home, or even sold it, without your knowledge. Property fraud is rare but financially devastating. Criminals target properties that are unmortgaged, rented out, or standing empty, especially when the owner lives elsewhere. The UK Land Registry property alert service offers a simple early-warning to identify potential problems. It can’t stop fraud by itself, but it gives you the crucial time to act before a transaction is completed.

How the alert system works

When you sign up for Property Alerts, the Land Registry emails you whenever it records activity on a monitored title deed, such as a change of ownership, a new mortgage, or a change to the registered owner’s details.

You can monitor up to ten properties per account, even if you don’t live at them. The service is free, quick to set up, and you can unsubscribe at any time.

Alerts don’t block applications. They simply let you know that something has been submitted, prompting you to check whether it’s legitimate. If you weren’t expecting any activity, you can intervene before money or ownership changes hands.

Who should register

Almost everyone can benefit, but it’s particularly valuable for:

  • Mortgage-free properties that criminals could attempt to mortgage or sell.
  • Rental or vacant properties where post might go unnoticed.
  • Elderly or vulnerable owners who may not spot irregularities quickly.
  • Second homes or overseas owners who spend long periods away.

If you fall into any of these categories, registering for alerts is one of the easiest and most effective precautions you can take. When a property is mortgaged, the lender’s financial interest provides a layer of protection. The mortgage company, as the primary creditor, won’t permit changes to ownership or certain new charges, such as additional loans, without their consent while the mortgage is still outstanding. However, secondary charges, like secured loans, can still be placed on the property, even if the mortgage is still in place. Once the mortgage is fully repaid, the primary creditor’s protections no longer apply, and the property is free from these restrictions.

How to strengthen your defences

Property alerts are only one layer of protection. Here are some additional options:

  • Consider monitoring properties belonging to family and friends, and have them monitor your property.
  • Ask a solicitor or conveyancer to add an anti-fraud restriction requiring identity certification before any sale or mortgage.
  • Stay alert to emails from the HM Land Registry Property Alert service and use inbox rules to flag them if your incoming email volume is exceptionally high. If an unexpected alert arrives, contact HM Land Registry straight away using the official number on their website
  • If identity theft is suspected, call your bank, report to Action Fraud, and consider a Credit Industry Fraud Avoidance System (CIFAS) protective registration.

Once a fraudulent action is registered, unravelling it can be lengthy and costly, though not impossible. Although HM Land Registry indemnifies victims if they lose property through no fault of their own, the process of proving your claim and restoring the title deed can be long and distressing. Prevention remains far easier than correction. Identifying problems and responding quickly is vital, and doesn’t require complex tools or expensive subscriptions.

You can register for free at https://propertyalert.landregistry.gov.uk/