Identity and Access Management for AI Agents

AI agents are changing the identity security landscape. Unlike conventional applications, agents can interpret objectives, access sensitive information, invoke tools, and take action with a degree of autonomy. They may work across multiple systems, collaborate with other agents, and alter their behaviour as circumstances change. This creates significant opportunities for enterprises, but also introduces a new kind of identity risk.

When considering the challenges of managing identities and permissions for AI agents, I found myself reflecting on complex IAM projects I had undertaken in the past. One recurring challenge was establishing which user accounts belonged to which individuals across numerous applications, often with inconsistent naming conventions and no straightforward means of correlating accounts to a single identity. These experiences reinforced the importance of establishing identity, ownership, and accountability before attempting to manage access effectively. Although AI agents introduce new complexities, many of the underlying IAM challenges are familiar.

Many Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems were designed for a more predictable environment. A person signs in, an application requests access, or a service account performs a predefined function. Permissions are often assigned in advance and remain in place until somebody reviews or revokes them.

AI agents challenge these assumptions. Their activity can be dynamic, their access requirements can change from one task to the next, and their actions may occur at machine speed. Establishing trust at the beginning of a session is no longer enough. Organisations need to understand whether that trust remains justified throughout the agent’s activity.

As AI agents become part of everyday enterprise operations, identity security must evolve in three important ways. Organisations must:

  • Continuously understand identity risk
  • Reduce standing privilege through context-aware access
  • Establish trusted identities for AI agents

AI agents are joining the enterprise identity estate

An AI agent is not simply another piece of software running in the background. An agent may be able to retrieve customer records, analyse internal documents, update business systems, write code, initiate workflows, or communicate with employees and customers. More advanced agents may plan sequences of actions and select the tools needed to complete an objective. Those capabilities make an agent an active participant in the enterprise. From a security perspective, it must be treated as an identity.

That identity must be discoverable, authenticated, and governed. The organisation needs to know who created the agent, who owns it, what purpose it serves, which systems it can access, and what actions it is authorised to perform. It must also be possible to determine which human, application, or agent initiated a particular action. Without this foundation, organisations risk creating a growing population of powerful but poorly understood identities.

This is not an entirely new problem. Enterprises already manage human users alongside service accounts, workloads, machines, application identities, and other non-human identities. Many organisations continue to struggle with excessive permissions, unclear ownership, and credentials that remain active long after their original purpose has disappeared.

AI agents add another layer of complexity. They can act more independently than conventional non-human identities while operating with less direct oversight than human users. They therefore need governance that reflects both their technical nature and their potential autonomy.

Traditional access models are reaching their limits

Many access models are based on a relatively static idea of trust. An identity is authenticated, assigned a role, and given access to a defined set of resources. Periodic certification processes are then used to determine whether those permissions remain appropriate. This model already creates risk when people change roles or service accounts accumulate access over time. In an agentic environment, its limitations become more pronounced.

There is also an important parallel between human users and AI agents. A human employee may have legitimate access to a system but use that access beyond the responsibilities or authority associated with their role. An AI agent presents a similar challenge. Technical capability to perform an action does not mean that the action falls within its authorised mandate. The difference is that an autonomous agent may act at greater speed, across multiple systems, and without the same opportunities for human intervention. The fundamental IAM principle remains unchanged. Access must be governed by what an identity is authorised to do, not simply what it is technically able to do.

An agent’s legitimate access requirements may vary considerably between tasks. A customer-service agent might need to read a customer record to answer a question, update an address following explicit approval, and initiate a refund only when additional conditions have been satisfied. Giving that agent broad, persistent access because it might occasionally need those capabilities increases the potential impact of an error, manipulation, or compromise.

The issue is not necessarily whether the agent should ever be allowed to perform a sensitive action. It is whether that permission should exist continuously. Identity security must therefore move beyond asking, “Does this identity have access?” It must also ask:

  • Why is access being requested?
  • What objective is the agent pursuing?
  • Who or what initiated the task?
  • Which data and tools are involved?
  • Is the requested action consistent with the agent’s intended purpose?
  • Has the identity’s risk changed since access was granted?
  • Should additional approval or verification be required?

These questions cannot be answered effectively through authentication alone. They require an ongoing understanding of identity, entitlement, behaviour, and context.

Continuously understand identity risk

Organisations need a unified view of risk across human, non-human, and AI identities. That starts with visibility. Security teams must be able to discover the identities operating throughout the enterprise and understand the relationships between them. This includes the permissions they hold, the credentials they use, the resources they can reach, and the people or systems accountable for them.

For AI agents, visibility should extend to their purpose, tools, data sources, and operating boundaries. An organisation should be able to distinguish between an approved production agent, an experimental agent created by a development team, and an unregistered agent connecting to corporate systems. Discovery, however, is only the first step.

Identity risk changes continuously. An agent may begin a task under normal conditions and later request an unusual permission, access a sensitive repository, or invoke a tool it has never used before. Its credentials could be exposed, its instructions could be manipulated, or its behaviour could diverge from its established purpose. Risk assessment must therefore be continuous rather than periodic.

Signals can include the sensitivity of the requested resource, the identity’s current privileges, the origin of the request, recent behaviour, unusual tool use, and the relationship between the requested action and the assigned task. The objective is to build a current picture of risk and use it to inform access decisions.

This does not mean treating every deviation as malicious. Agents may legitimately encounter new conditions as they work. The security model must be able to distinguish reasonable adaptation from unacceptable risk, and respond proportionately.

Depending on the circumstances, that response could involve granting access, limiting functionality, requesting approval, requiring stronger verification, or stopping the activity altogether.

Reduce standing privileges

Permanently assigned privilege is particularly dangerous in an agentic environment. When an identity permanently holds more access than it needs, every error or compromise has a larger potential impact. With AI agents operating quickly and across connected systems, excessive privilege can allow an isolated problem to spread before a human has time to intervene.

Organisations should minimise the permissions held by default and provide additional access only when it is required for an authorised task. This is the principle of just-in-time, least-privilege access: the right identity receives the right level of access to the right resource for the minimum necessary period.

For an AI agent, that could mean receiving permission to read a particular dataset for one task rather than having permanent access to the entire data platform. It could mean being allowed to prepare a transaction but not approve it, or to invoke a tool only after a human has authorised a sensitive step. Crucially, these decisions should be based on real-time context rather than static role membership alone.

The same request may present different levels of risk depending on the data involved, the agent’s recent activity, the task it is performing, and the way the request was initiated. Context allows organisations to make more precise decisions instead of choosing between unrestricted access and complete denial.

Access should also expire automatically when the task is complete. This prevents temporary permissions from becoming permanent entitlements and reduces the burden on manual review processes. The result is a more adaptive model of privilege, one that supports useful automation without giving agents broad authority simply because they may need it in the future.

Establish trusted identities for AI agents

Every enterprise AI agent should have its own verifiable identity. Shared credentials and generic service accounts make it difficult to establish accountability. If several agents use the same identity, security teams cannot reliably determine which agent performed an action, who authorised it, or whether the activity was appropriate. A distinct agent identity creates the basis for effective governance.

That identity should be linked to an owner, a defined business purpose, and an approved set of capabilities. Its lifecycle should be managed from creation through modification to retirement. Credentials should be protected and rotated, permissions should be reviewed, and unused identities should be disabled promptly.

Trust should also extend beyond the identity itself. Before an agent is allowed to act, the organisation may need to verify the integrity of its operating environment, the tools it is invoking, and the source of its instructions. These checks help establish a chain of trust connecting the agent, the person or system directing it, the resources it accesses, and the actions it performs.

Policy can then be applied consistently. An agent can be granted access when its identity is verified, its purpose is authorised, the requested action is appropriate, and the current risk is acceptable. When those conditions change, its access can change with them. This makes trust conditional rather than permanent.

Preserve accountability and human control

Autonomy does not remove the need for accountability. Organisations must be able to reconstruct what an agent did, which information it accessed, which tools it invoked, and why a decision was made. Audit records should connect activity to the agent’s identity, its owner, and the person or process that initiated the task.

Higher-impact actions may also require meaningful human oversight. The objective is not to place a human approval step in front of every agent action. That would undermine much of the value of automation. Instead, organisations should define clear boundaries based on risk.

Routine, low-risk actions may be completed automatically within established policies. Sensitive or irreversible actions may require approval, segregation of duties, or additional verification. Activity that falls outside the agent’s defined purpose may need to be blocked and investigated. These controls allow autonomy to increase without allowing accountability to disappear.

Identity security becomes central to securing enterprise AI

AI agents will increasingly operate across applications, data repositories, and business processes. Trying to secure each interaction in isolation will become difficult as the number of agents and integrations grows.

Identity provides a common control point. By establishing which agent is acting, who is responsible for it, what it is trying to accomplish, which permissions it holds, and the risk it currently presents, organisations can govern agent activity consistently across different systems.

It connects visibility, authentication, authorisation, privileged access management, monitoring, and governance. It also gives organisations a consistent way to apply policy as agents move between tools and environments.

The purpose is not to restrict AI adoption. It is to create the conditions in which organisations can use agents confidently and at scale.

Trust must be earned continuously

Identity models built around static roles, persistent privileges, and occasional reviews are not sufficient to secure AI agents. For enterprises, the priority is clear:

  • Continuously understand identity risk across human, non-human, and AI identities.
  • Reduce standing privilege through access decisions informed by real-time context.
  • Establish trusted identities for AI agents and grant only the access they need, when they need it.

As AI agents become more capable and more deeply embedded in business operations, trust can no longer be treated as a one-time decision. It must be continuously established, evaluated, and enforced.